

A. MUTUALITY AND RESPECT: MEN AND WOMEN AT WORSHIP IN PUBLIC, AND RICH AND POOR AT THE LORD'S SUPPER (11:2-34)

1. Mutuality and Reciprocity: Self-Respect, Respect for the Other, and Gender Identity in Public Worship (11:2-16)

(2) I give you full credit for keeping me in mind unfaithfully, and for continuing to hold fast to the traditions which I, in turn, handed on to you. (3) However, I want you to understand that while Christ is preeminent (or *head?* *source?*) for man, man is foremost (or *head?* *source?*) in relation to woman, and God is preeminent (or *head?* *source?*) in relation to Christ. (4) Every man who prays or who utters prophetic speech with his head covered (possibly *with long hair*) shames his head. (5, 6) Every woman who prays or who utters prophetic speech with her head uncovered (less probably, *with long, loose, unbound hair*) shames her head, for it is one and the same thing as a woman whose head had been shaved. For if a woman will not retain her head covering, let her have it cropped close to the head. If, however, to have it cropped close or to have it shaved off brings shame, let her retain her head covering. (7, 8, 9) For a man, for his part, ought not to have his head covered up since man is constituted in the image of God and [manifests] his glory. Woman, on the other hand, is the glory of a man. For it is not the case that man came from woman, but woman was made out of man. For, further, man was not created on woman's account, but woman was created on account of man. (10) Because of this a woman ought to keep control of her head, on account of the angels. (11, 12) Nevertheless, as those in the Lord, although woman is nothing apart from man, man is nothing apart from woman. For just as woman had her origin from man, even so man derives his existence through woman; and the source of everything is God. (13) Come to a decision for yourselves. Is it appropriate for a woman to conduct prayer to God without wearing a hood? (just possibly *with her hair unbound?*) (14, 15) Does not even the very ordering of how things are teach you that if long hair degrades a man, long hair is a woman's glory, because long hair is given as a covering? (16) If anyone is minded to be contentious, we ourselves have no such custom, nor do the churches of God.

Our bibliography for this section alone identifies some eighty publications that invite attention in addition to commentaries and other standard works regularly cited. Yet with a few notable exceptions (see Murphy-O'Connor and others cited below), most writers insist that this passage concerns the clothing (or hairstyle) of *women* rather than (as 11:4 makes clear) of *men and women*. As Roland Barthes among others points out, clothes and hair or beards play a role in a semiotic system which speak volumes about self-perceptions of gender identity, class identity, a sense of occasion, and respect or indifference toward

the perception of others. Further, there are multilayered metaphorical and cultural nuances which exclude any understanding of language in these verses in terms of lexicography alone. As Gregory Dawes well argues, it is beside the point to count up how many instances of κεφαλή (11:3-7, 10) mean *head*, in the sense of *chief*; many denote *source*; and how many denote *head in contrast to body*, if Paul and his readers presuppose metaphorical extension or interactive application of the term.¹

A further complication arises from the existence of multiple reconstructions of the situation at Corinth. Throughout this commentary we have stressed the importance of looking primarily to Roman cultural and social norms for mid-first-century Corinth, rather than those of Greece which precede 44 BC and steadily return to regain a new peak, after Paul's lifetime, in the age of Hadrian. We refer in the Introduction to the huge preponderance of Latin inscriptions over Greek at Corinth in Paul's day, and even if many flooded into the Roman colony as business people, traders, artisans, or slaves, the main social norms to which Corinthian culture aspired were those of Rome rather than Greece.

Nevertheless, research by classicists demonstrates an unevenness and fluidity in the expectations and status of women in mid-century Roman culture, depending on a variety of factors. Aline Rousselle's essay "Body Politics in Ancient Rome" (1992) assumes great importance for the issue of *head coverings, veils*, or "hoods" (cf. *κατὰ κεφαλῆς ἔχων*, v. 4; *ἀκατακάλυπτος*, v. 5; *κατακαλύπτεται*, v. 6; cf. Latin [Jerome] by contrast, *nudo capite*).² Augustus reformed family law in ways which affected the status of women some three times between 18 BC and AD 9 (*lex Julia de adulteriis*; *lex Julia de fundo dotali*, et al.). Horace (d. 8 BC) tells us, on one side, that certain *male* attire or hair-styles were deemed effeminate and overtly sexual, while appropriate head coverings for respectable Roman *women* served as a protection of their dignity and status as *women not to be propositioned*.³ A. Rousselle and Dale Martin both urge that in the case of respected and respectable women "one sees only the face": "respectable women did nothing to draw attention to themselves. . . . A veil or hood constituted a warning: it signified that the wearer was a respectable woman and that no man dare approach without risking . . . penalties. A woman who went out . . . unveiled forfeited the protection of Roman law against possible attackers who were entitled to plead extenuating circumstances."⁴ Rousselle and Martin urge that the point behind Paul's instruction is "to signify that, regardless of their status under other laws, they were untouchable for Christian men."⁴

Public worship was neither the occasion for women to become "objects" of attraction to be "sized up" by men; nor an occasion for women to offer

1. Dawes, *The Body in Question: Metaphor and Meaning in the Interpretation of Ephesians 5:21-33*, esp. 122-49.

2. A. Rousselle, "Body Politics in Ancient Rome," in Duby and Perot (eds.), *A History of Women in the West, 1: From Ancient Goddesses to Christian Saints*, 296-337.

3. Ibid., 315; Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 229-49.

4. Rousselle, "Body Politics," and Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 229-49.

The history of claims about the meaning of κεφαλή is immense and daunting. It is doubtful whether Fee is entirely correct in suggesting that "all commentaries up to Barrett and Conzelmann" perceive the metaphorical force of κεφαλή as "hierarchical, setting up structures of authority," any more than he can claim so confidently that "nothing in the passage suggests as much [i.e., this view]. . . . Paul's understanding of the metaphor [and] . . . the only one the Corinthians would have grasped is 'head' as 'source', especially 'source of life.'"⁴² It does not seem to be the case on careful scrutiny that up until the 1970s the view was virtually always that of "headship," after which virtually all exegetes perceived that κεφαλή really meant *source*. This is open to question because (i) more than one patristic commentator notes the highly open-textured, *multivalent* force of κεφαλή as revolving *metaphorically* around the *physiological head-body contrast*; (ii) the view that κεφαλή means *source* has undergone serious criticism recently. Thus Horrell (1996) observes, "Recent work has cast doubt on the appropriateness of 'source' as a translation of κεφαλή."⁴³ Even if we hesitate to accept the careful and detailed arguments of Wayne Grudem (1985) and J. Fitzmyer (1989 and 1993) that the word denotes *authoritative headship* (see below), no less important and perhaps still more convincing are the arguments of Richard S. Cervin (1989) and especially A. C. Perriman (1994) that κεφαλή denotes primarily head in contrast to body but more widely (including in 11:3) "that which is most prominent, foremost, uppermost, pre-eminent."⁴⁴ The sustained arguments about κεφαλή put forward by Gregory Dawes (1998) confirm these conclusions with sufficient evidence and argument (albeit much relating to Eph 5:21-33) to persuade us to use the three English words *preeminent* (of Christ), *foremost* (of man), and *preeminent* (of God), even if we felt obliged to leave *head* in square brackets as a still arguable translation. Note: A summary and conclusions occur at the end of this discussion for those who wish to bypass the more detailed arguments.

κεφαλή AND ITS MULTIPLE MEANINGS

1. Authority, Supremacy, Leadership

This is the traditional rendering from the medieval period onward. Robertson and Plummer write, "By κεφαλή is meant supremacy. . . . Christ is the head of man; man is the head of woman . . . 3:23; Eph 1:22; 4:15; 5:23. . . . God is supreme. . . . This was a favorite Arian text; it is in harmony with 15:24-28."⁴⁵ J. A. Fitzmyer has strongly con-

tended that this view should be reinstated in contrast to the attempts of S. Bedale (1954), Robin Scroggs (1972), and J. Murphy-O'Connor (1980, 1988) to argue for the meaning *source* (see below).⁴⁶ Fitzmyer notes that in the LXX κεφαλή translates Heb. ראש (ro'sh) *head*, some 281 times, of which the subcategory meaning *leader* occurs in at least 3 places in Exodus and at least 11 times in Judges (e.g., Judg 10:18; 11:8, 9, 11). 2 Sam 22:44 is a key text for this meaning, as Murphy-O'Connor concedes.⁴⁷ However, if we understand κεφαλή — ראש to include *head* in the sense of English *top*, the numerical ratio is increased.⁴⁸ Fitzmyer shows that a wider range of passages than those cited by Murphy-O'Connor bear the meaning *chief, leader, leadership* especially in conjunction with the sense of *preeminent* or *top*. We shall explore these further in the light of the data from Brown-Driver-Briggs (1980 ed.) when we return to our own translation. Fitzmyer concludes: "The upshot . . . is that a Hellenistic Jewish writer such as Paul of Tarsus could well have intended that κεφαλή in 1 Cor 11:3 be understood as 'head' in the sense of authority or supremacy over someone else."⁴⁹

Fitzmyer's work largely vindicates the "traditional" interpretation of Weiss, Robertson and Plummer, Wendland, Allo, Lietzmann and Kümmel, Grosheide, and Héring, whose arguments Murphy-O'Connor and Fee tend to underrate. Héring argues that even in the case of Christ "the term clearly indicates the Son's subordination to the Father."⁵⁰ Conzelmann also notes the role of "subordination" but only (rightly) within a broader and more complex frame: "Head" does not [in the OT] denote the sovereignty of one person over another but over a community. . . . Subordination [in Christology] is also expressed in terms of a totally different complex of ideas."⁵¹ Wolff, however, underlines the Pauline emphasis on the creation "order" as against Corinthian cries for "freedom."⁵²

Wayne Grudem provides a survey of 2,336 instances of κεφαλή in the writings of thirty-six Greek authors (based on *Thesaurae Linguae Graecae* from the eighth century BC to the fourth century AD.⁵³ Of these, over 2,000 denote the "actual physical head of a man or animal," while of the remaining 302 metaphorical uses, 49 apply to a "person of superior authority or rank, or 'ruler,' ruling part." No instances were discovered in which κεφαλή had the meaning 'source,' origin."⁵⁴ R. S. Cervin offered different conclusions, and hence in 1990 Grudem produced "a Response" to Cervin and to other recent studies which attempt to reinstate "source" or the meaning of "preeminent" or "foremost" without the explicit entailment of "authority over."⁵⁵ Here he repeats his conclusions of 1985 and subjects Cervin's methods and conclusions to criticism. Grudem's critique of the proposals about "source" seems convincing, but his

46. Fitzmyer, "Another Look at κεφαλή in 1 Cor 11:3," 503-11.

47. Ibid., 506; Murphy-O'Connor, "Sex and Logic in 1 Cor 11:2-16," 492; cf. 482-500.

48. Fitzmyer, "Another Look at κεφαλή," 506-9.

49. Ibid., 510; cf. BDB (1980 ed.), 910-11. Fitzmyer cites passages from Deuteronomy, 1 Kings, Judges, 2 Samuel, and elsewhere, which BDB also support.

50. Héring, *First Epistle*, 103.

51. Conzelmann, *1 Cor*, 183, n. 21 and n. 26.

52. Wolff, *Der erste Brief*, 248-49.

53. Grudem, "Does κεφαλή ('Head') Mean 'Source' or 'Authority Over' in Greek Literature? A Survey of 2,336 Examples," 38-59.

54. Ibid., 49 and 52.

55. Grudem, "The Meaning of κεφαλή ('Head'): A Response to Recent Studies," *TrinJ* 11 (1990): 3-72.

42. Fee, *First Epistle*, 502, 502, n. 41, and 503.

43. Horrell, *Social Ethos*, 171. Against Horrell (1996) Dawes (1998), Perriman (1994), and Hays (1997) defend *source* (earlier Bedale, Barrett, Bruce, and Fee), and this view is still maintained by Schrage (1995), Murphy-O'Connor (1997), and Horsley (1998).

44. Perriman, "The Head of a Woman: The Meaning of κεφαλή in 1 Cor 11:3," 618; cf. 602-22; also Cervin, "Does κεφαλή Mean 'Source' or 'Authority Over' in Greek Literature? A Rebuttal," 85-112.

45. Robertson and Plummer, *First Epistle*, 229.

attempt to insist that the sense of "head" used by Paul necessarily carries with it notions of authority rather than prominence, eminence, representation, or preeminence is less conclusive, especially when he concedes that some 2,000 of 2,336 occurrences presuppose the semantic contrast between physical head and physical body.

2. Source, Origin, Temporal Priority

As early as 1954, S. Bedale proposed that κεφαλή could mean *source*.⁵⁶ However, he does not deny, as Murphy-O'Connor was to do, that the Greek word "carries with it the sense of 'authority,'" including its use in 1 Cor 11:3.⁵⁷ By contrast, Murphy-O'Connor in 1989 argued that the word "never denotes authority or superiority," while by 1997 he had softened this to "the instances where 'head' implies superiority are very rare."⁵⁸ F. F. Bruce holds a position between Bedale and Murphy-O'Connor on the same spectrum: "we are probably to understand not . . . 'chief' or 'ruler' but rather 'source' or 'origin' — a sense well attested for Gk. *kephalē*."⁵⁹ Bruce bases his argument largely on the assumption that "source" fits the logic of later verses in this passage, and the role of Christ as "source" of human existence. Christ "derives his eternal being" from God (3:23; 8:6).⁶⁰ Barrett is perhaps on firmer ground when he argues that since κεφαλή can denote the part standing for the whole (e.g., head of cattle, see below), this may extend as a metaphor for the source or origin of the person or object in question. Barrett then expresses the view which he shares with Bruce, that this sense "is strongly suggested by verses 8f. Paul does not say that man is the lord (κύριος) of the woman; he says he is the origin of her being."⁶¹ He argues further, with Bruce, that the relation between Christ and God "can be understood in a similar way. The Father is *fons divinitatis*; the Son is what he is in relation to the Father."⁶² R. Scroggs (1972 and 1974) presses the case further. Gal 3:27-28 had already established "the societal-levelevelling quality of baptism," and the use of κεφαλή in 1 Cor 11:3 carries no hint of female subordination. Everything hinges on mutual dependence throughout the passage.⁶³ "In normal Greek κεφαλή does not mean lordship."⁶⁴

John P. Meier also argues that "we have here a later Hellenistic use of *kephalē* with metaphysical overtones. The idea is 'source' or 'origin,' especially the origin of something's existence. A chain of sources or emanations is being set up. God is the source of the Messiah . . . the Son is God's instrument in creation . . . (1 Cor 8:6). Christ is the source and perhaps also the Platonic archetype of the male . . . Genesis 2 states that woman was made from the rib of man. The chain of being, the order of creation,

56. S. Bedale, "The Meaning of κεφαλή in the Pauline Epistles," *JTS* n.s. 5 (1954): 211-15.
57. *Ibid.*, 215.

58. Murphy-O'Connor, *1 Cor* 121; cf. his comment ad loc. in R. E. Brown, J. A. Fitzmyer, and R. E. Murphy (eds.), *New Jerome Biblical Commentary* (London: Chapman 1989), sects. 49, 53.

59. Bruce, *1 and 2 Cor*, 103.

60. *Ibid.*

61. Barrett, *First Epistle*, 248.

62. *Ibid.*, 249.

63. R. Scroggs, "Paul and the Eschatological Woman," *JAAR* 40 (1972): 283-303, and "Paul and the Eschatological Woman Revisited," *JAAR* 42 (1974): 532-37.

64. Scroggs, "Paul" (1972): 298.

necessarily involves subordination, with set places and roles."⁶⁵ Fee also argues for "source," but is closer to Scroggs and Murphy-O'Connor in rejecting the subordinationist aspect. Fee writes: "Paul's understanding of the metaphor, therefore, and almost certainly the only one the Corinthians would have grasped is 'head' as 'source,' especially 'source of life.' This seems corroborated by vv. 8-9."⁶⁶ Witherington (1988), Radcliffe (1990), and with more caution Schrage (1995) favor "source."⁶⁷ Schrage follows Schlier and Conzelmann in rejecting the notion that κεφαλή can normally denote authority over an individual (although he readily concedes that Heb. ראש (*ro'sh*) can denote leadership over a group), and rightly insists that the preponderance of uses in this passage denote the physiological head in contrast to body (cf. vv. 4a, 5a, 7, 10). He also points out, with J. D. G. Dunn, that since in 11:10 the woman who uses prophetic speech is said to have "authority" (ἐξουσίαν ἔχειν . . .) it is unlikely that the opening propositions serve to establish man's authority over woman.⁶⁸ Finally, Horsley (1998) advocates *source* on the basis of Philo's use of κεφαλή as progenitor for Abraham (Philo, *De Congressu Quaerendae* 61).⁶⁹

This argument comes up against three problems among others. (a) Is it convincing to ignore the weight of evidence adduced by Fitzmyer about the Hebrew and LXX and by Grudem about uses of κεφαλή in Greek literature? At times the debate degenerates into a confrontation over which meaning is allegedly "rare."⁷⁰ Certainly the LXX usage cannot be ignored. Scroggs presents a one-sided and incautious view, while arguably even the ever judicious Murphy-O'Connor may perhaps tend to overstate his case. (b) Granted that (as cannot be denied) the physiological use of κεφαλή hugely preponderates, can a metaphorical extension of the physical head readily mean *source*? We have to envisage a two-stage process in which a direct or level-one metaphor (**preeminence**, *foremost*, *top*) becomes a second-level metaphor for that preeminence from which other existence flows. However, this does not entail the total eclipse of the **preeminence**, *top-stone* dimension. (c) Much depends on drawing inferences about the christological relation to God in other Pauline passages. Here, although it is true that God is regarded as source (ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ) in contrast to mediate ground of existence (δι' οὗ τὰ πάντα καὶ ἡμεῖς δι' αὐτοῦ, 8:6), it remains the case for Paul that Christ's work is "for" God as preeminent (3:23; 15:24-28). The valid point in all

65. Meier, "On the Veiling of Hermeneutics (1 Cor 11:2-16)," 217-18; cf. 212-26.

66. Fee, *First Epistle*, 503. Fee also appeals to P. B. Payne, "Response," in A. Mickelsen (ed.), *Women, Authority and the Bible* (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1986), 113-32; and Kroeger, "The Classical Concept of 'Head' as 'Source,'" in Gaebelein Hull, *Equal to Serve* (American title *Serving Together* [New York, 1987]).

67. Schrage, *Der erste Brief*, 2:501-4; Witherington, *Women in the Earliest Churches*, 84-85; and Radcliffe, "Paul and Sexual Identity: 1 Cor 11:2-16," in Soskice (ed.), *After Eve*, 66.

68. Schrage, *Der erste Brief*, 2:504; Dunn, *The Theology of Paul*, 589-90; on 11:10 see below; also Gundry-Volf, "Gender and Creation," 159-60.

69. Horsley, *1 Cor* 153.

70. Puzzlingly, Witherington, e.g., cites H. Schlier, *TDNT*, 3:674-76, to support *source* as "well known in the extrabiblical literature" (*Women in the Earliest Churches*, 84 and 255, n. 37). But when we consult Schlier directly, this is hardly confirmed. Schlier identifies: (1) "first, supreme 'top' or [last in the list and only instantiated two or three times] also 'point', 'point of departure' . . . 'the mouth of a river . . . or also its source'" (Herodotus 4.91), also perhaps in Philo; (2) "prominent", 'outstanding', 'determinative'; (3) synecdoche for "the whole man." The Herodotus reference is clear but dates from the fifth century BC; the allusion in Philo is more ambivalent.

of the arguments for "source" is not that κεφαλή necessarily means source but that (pace Grudem) it does not seem to denote a relation of "subordination" or "authority over."

3. Synecdoche and Preeminence, Foremost, Topmost Serving Interactively as a Metaphor Drawn from the Physiological Head

Whether we scrutinize the use of κεφαλή in Greek literature (including the LXX and Jewish texts) or the Heb שָׂרָא (ro'sh), we find (a) the overwhelming majority of references to physiological head in contrast to body; and (b) a substantial number of occurrences of synecdoche, where heads denotes persons or animals (for which the part denotes the whole, as in "head of cattle," or "counting heads"). In theological terms this hints at a representative use: Christ stands for man or humankind in the new order, just as Adam is "head" of the race without the gospel (1 Cor 15:21-24; cf. Rom 5:12-21). This is further corroborated by the language about shame, image, and glory common to 11:4-6 and esp. 11:7 (εἰκὼν καὶ δόξα) and 15:49 (τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ ἐπουρανίου). This suggests only one nuance of the word, however.

Gregory Dawes devotes eighty pages of his study of this subject to theories of metaphor, including those of M. Beardsley, D. Davidson, Max Black, Janet Martin Soskice, and Paul Ricoeur. He concludes: "If this word is a living metaphor, it can (and should) be translated as 'head.' ... To translate the word as 'source' is to pre-judge an important issue: it is to imply that in this context the word is functioning as a dead metaphor" (his italics).⁷¹ Dawes himself argues that it is a living metaphor that carries neither the sense of "overload" (i.e., the approach under [i] is not fully satisfactory), "nor does it mean 'source' [view (ii)]."⁷² He cannot accept Grudem's conclusions on the ground that a word count overlooks the issues concerning metaphorical extension which lie at the heart of Dawes's argument.⁷³ Rightly, in my view, he asks the question over which I have agonized: in what sense would Paul and his readers use and understand this metaphor which not only elsewhere but specifically in 1 Cor 11:2-16 and in Eph 5:21-33 rests upon the head-body distinction of physiology?

From the side of the hellenistic linguistic background, it is possible to reconstruct a broad medical understanding of κεφαλή in the period from Hippocrates (460-380 BC) to Galen (AD 130-200). Contrary to what is often implied in older modern biblical studies, the ancient world was aware that the brain (ὁ ἐγκεφάλος) constituted a "source." "From the brain and from the brain only arise our pleasures, joys, laughter and jests, as well as our sorrows, pains, griefs . . .," but the brain also served as a "control": "It makes us mad or delirious, inspires us with dread . . . brings sleeplessness . . . and acts that are contrary to habit . . . All come from the brain" (ἀπὸ τοῦ ἐγκεφάλου).⁷⁴ Dawes cites sources in Pythagorean philosophy which apparently ascribed a "ruling" function to the brain.

Galen opposed the widespread claim that the heart is the source of nervous

71. Dawes, *The Body in Question*, 126.

72. Ibid., 127.

73. Ibid., 128-33.

74. Hippocrates, *De morbo sacro in Hippocrates*, LCL (London: Heinemann, 1952), 2:174 and 175.

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experience: "the source of all the nerves (τῶν νεύρων) is the brain (ὁ ἐγκεφάλος)."⁷⁵ Galen perceives that motion and sensation owe their function to the brain: the themes of "source" and of "controlling function" both play a part in medical vocabulary and thought.⁷⁶ Within two or three years of the date of our epistle, Seneca writes to Nero that the head is a source of health or well-being: *a capite bona valetudo*.⁷⁷ However, Sevenster emphasizes the metaphor of headship and control in these passages, where Dawes focuses more closely on source. As Sevenster notes, the issue in *de clementia* is to plead that as Emperor Nero will, like the head of a body, radiate kindness which will permeate the empire to bring it health, the people will do the same; Dawes cites the parallel in the *Moral Epistles* of Nero as a source of well-being to the "body" of the empire.⁷⁸

From the side of the LXX and Hebrew background, W. J. Martin very well maps a wide semantic field within which *topmost*, synecdoche for *totality*, responsible *eminence*, and *cornerstone* play major roles.⁷⁹ Similarly, Dawes concludes that the precise force of the metaphor must be contextually determined: in Eph 5:22-24 it can have no other meaning than "authority over," but this depends on context rather than on lexicography. The problem about translating κεφαλή as *head* in 1 Cor 11:3 remains that, as R. Cervin notes, in English-speaking contexts "the head" almost always implies leadership and authority, as in headmaster, Head of School, Head of Department, head steward.⁸⁰ As we noted earlier, Perriman convincingly urges that the equivalent assumption in first-century hellenistic contexts would be to construe the metaphorical force of *head* not as authoritative leader in charge, but as one who is "prominent, foremost, uppermost, preeminent."⁸¹ Senft, Horrell, and in effect Hasler share this view, although Hasler argues that in the context of Paul's deliberative rhetoric a dialectic embraces both the arrangement or "placing" of creation and the new liturgical dignity and equality of the woman who uses prophetic speech within the frame of "glory" received from God.⁸² BDB (for Heb.), LSJ (classical Gk.), BAGD, Grimm-Thayer, MM, and Louw-Nida point in this direction (see below).

The multivalency of the term שָׂרָא (ro'sh) for Jewish converts who know the LXX translations should not be forgotten, as Fitzmyer rightly insists (against Scroggs). Of five Hebrew words which κεφαλή translates this is by far the most common.⁸³ Brown-Driver-Briggs (1980) divide uses into eight categories with subdivisions as follows: (1) *head*, (a) of humans; (b) of animals; (2) *top* (e.g., of rocks, towers, pillars, ladders); (3) *chief*, (a) chief man (see Fitzmyer, above); (b) chief city; (c) chief nation; (d) chief priest; (e) head of family; (4) *front place*, e.g., taken by the leader but also used

75. Galen, *On the Doctrines of Hippocrates and Plato*, in *Corpus Medicorum Graecorum* V:4:1, 2 (Berlin: Berlin Academy, 1981), 1.7.55.

76. Galen, *De Usu Partium* 12.4.

77. Seneca, *De Clementia* 2.2.1; cf. *Epistles* 95.52; and *De Ira* 2.31.7.

78. Sevenster, *Paul and Seneca*, 171-72; Dawes, *The Body in Question*, 132-33.

79. Martin, "1 Cor 11:2-16: An Interpretation," in W. W. Gasque and R. P. Martin (eds.), *Apocalyptic History and the Gospel*, 232-33; cf. 231-41.

80. Cervin, "Does κεφαλή Mean 'Source' or 'Authority Over'?" 87.

81. Perriman, "The Head of a Woman," cf. 602-22.

82. Horrell, *Social Ethos*, 171-72 (cf. 168-76); Senft, *La première Épître*, 141, "le sommet"; Hasler, "Die Gleichstellung der Gattin. Situationskritische Reflexionen zu 1 Kor 11:2-16," 189-200.

83. Hatch-Redpath, *Concordance to the Septuagint*, 2:760-62.

of priority in time; (5) *best*; (6) of an army company; (7) *sum* or total; (8) residual nuances.⁸⁴ Liddell-Scott-Jones offer a survey of classical Greek uses which is remarkably similar, beginning with (1) *head* of man or beast; (2) *synecdoche* for the whole person; (3) *head* of a vegetable; (4) the *capital* or chief place; (5) the *crown* or completion of something; (6) *chief* (and the idiom *κατὰ κεφαλῆς*, over the head, e.g., from Homer, *Iliad* 18.24, onward; cf. 11.4).⁸⁵

For the period of NT Greek, BAGD does not differ significantly. The most frequent and prominent, once again, are (1) heads of persons or animals in the physiological sense, e.g., the hairs of the head (Matt 10:30; Luke 7:38; Philo, *De Legatione ad Galum* 223); and after this (2) *synecdoche* (e.g., Rom 12:20, "coals of fire on his head," perhaps from a curse formula); (3) head "metaphorically" in contrast to the church as body (Col 1:18; cf. 2:19); (4) "figuratively" to denote superior rank; (5) also to denote uppermost part, end, point, keystone (Acts 4:12; 1 Pet 2:7) and either capital or frontier city (Acts 16:12). With Grudem, neither BAGD nor Lattke in *EDNT* nor Grimm-Thayer appear to propose *source*, even under either "metaphor" (BAGD, 16) or "figurative" use (BAGD's 2a, b).⁸⁶ It appears that Louw and Nida also focus on *physiological head*, *superior*, or *cornerstone*, but not *source*.⁸⁷ Moulton-Milligan stress the occurrence of (1) physiological head; (2) *synecdoche*, and (3) extremity or topmost in the papyrus, also without apparent mention of *source*.⁸⁸ H. Schlier, as we earlier noted, identifies "first," "prominent," and *synecdoche*, with only a couple of isolated instances in Herodotus (484-425 BC). And perhaps in Philo.⁸⁹ He does not appear to propose this meaning for 1 Cor 11:3.

It is significant that in Lampe's *Patristic Greek Lexicon* virtually the only occasion on which the meaning of κεφαλή is compared with ἀρχή as "equivalent" is with reference to 1 Cor 11:3, on the basis of the application of ἀρχή to God in relation to Christ, and Christ in relation to the world (but with the important proviso that ἀρχή is also multivalent as beginning or source, or as first principle, or as ruler, authority).⁹⁰ In the patristic era the emphasis begins to shift from physiological head to the metaphorical use in the ecclesial order as religious superior or bishop (e.g., Athanasius, *Apology* 89), head of the house, or to Christ as head of creation, or as head of the church (Origen, *John* 1:13). Nevertheless, whether we consult the standard lexicons or the TLG (with Grudem), this kind of data is insufficiently nuanced contextually to give us a complete picture.

Here it becomes significant to return to Chrysostom, whom we had in mind when we initially queried Fee's generalization about eras of study and their related conclusion. Chrysostom is highly sensitive to the multivalency of κεφαλή in 1 Cor 11:3. Chrysostom is aware that a parallel between men/women and God/Christ should not give "the heretics" grounds for a subordinationist Christology. In certain respects

head denotes a kind of primacy, but both God and Christ on one side and men and women on the other are of the same mode of being. "For had Paul meant to speak of rule and subjection . . . he would not have brought forward the instance of a woman (or wife), but rather of a slave and a master. . . . It is a wife (or woman) as free, as equal in honour; and the Son also, though He did become obedient to the Father, it was as the Son of God; it was as God."⁹¹ While we must avoid reading back patristic doctrines of the Trinity into Pauline texts, Chrysostom (a) reflects Paul's notion that in the context of love between God and Christ, or between man and woman, obedience or response is *chosen*, not *imposed*; and (b) reflects the endeavor to do justice to the *duality* or *wholeness* of difference and "order" on one side and reciprocity and mutual dignity and respect on the other.

Chrysostom's one major deviation from Paul's explicit argument in this chapter arises when he distinguishes between woman in creation and woman after the fall. Initially, he comments, woman is "bone of his bone, flesh of his flesh" (Gen 2:23). In creation, he argues, "there is no subjection," but when freedom was misused this status was revised (Gen 3:16). Chrysostom is influenced, it seems, by 2 Tim 2:14 at this point. On the other hand, this observation may be deemed a digression from his main point: "Even to the simple the difference is evident" between applications of the word *head* to Christ, to man, and to God (my italics). In the case of the man-woman relationship the physiological head shares "like passions with the body," just as God and Christ share the same nature and being. By contrast the first proportion entails a sharper difference: Christ as *head* of man does share man's order of being.⁹² Chrysostom appreciates the sensitivity of the various nuances that may be conveyed.

Tertullian similarly recognizes the interactive force of the metaphor of *head*: "This, to be sure, is an astonishing thing, that the Father can be taken to be the face of the Son (2 Cor 4:6) when he is his head; for 'the head of Christ is God'" (1 Cor 11:3).⁹³ In effect he anticipates Ramsey's principle that where models conflict or complement each other, unwanted meanings fall away, and the models are thereby qualified.⁹⁴ On the other hand, Tertullian goes further. In his specific discussion of the meaning of veils upon the head, he argues that here *head* is used as a *synecdoche* for the woman herself; "the whole head constitutes the woman."⁹⁵ Clearly Augustine is wary of conceiving of *caput* either as head in an authoritarian sense or still more any notion of "source," since he cites 11:3 in his treatise on the Trinity precisely to underline the eternal sonship of Christ and the aseity, equality, and "immortality" of the Trinity: "some things were made by the Father, and some by the Son. . . . The Son is equal with the Father, and the working of the Father and the Son is indivisible. . . . 'Being in the form of God . . . [Phil 2:6] . . . 'the head of Christ is God' [1 Cor 11:3]."⁹⁶

Fee's general statement may perhaps more readily apply to such patristic writers as Origen and Jerome. Origen is more at ease with a quasi-subordinationist Christology, qualifying Col 1:16, 17, with reference to 1 Cor 11:3, "alone having as head God

84. BDB (1980 ed.), 910-11.

85. LSJ, 801 (with minor changes to numbering).

86. BAGD, 430. Cf. further Grimm-Thayer, 345. M. Lattke, *EDNT*, 2:284-86, goes further: he excludes the proposal about *emanation* on the ground of the NT and biblical theme of *creatio ex nihilo* (285).

87. Louw-Nida, 1:95-96, 739; and 2:141.

88. MM, 342. ἀνεγκεφαλος is used metaphorically to mean "brainless."

89. Schlier, *TDNT*, 3:674; cf. 673-82 (in spite of Witherington's appeal noted above).

90. Lampe, *Patristic Greek Lexicon*, 749; on ἀρχή see BAGD, 111-12.

91. Chrysostom, *1 Cor. Hom.*, 26:2.

92. *Ibid.*, 26:3.

93. *Ibid.*, 26:3.

94. Tertullian, *Against Praxeas*, 14.

95. I. Ramsey, *Religious Language* (London: SCM, 1957).

96. Tertullian, *On the Veiling of Women*, 17:2 (on 1 Cor 11:6).

the Father, for it is written 'The head of Christ is God'" (1 Cor 11:3).⁹⁷ Jerome comments on 11:3: "*Vir nulli subjectus est nisi Christo, . . . Mulier vero et Christo et viro debet esse subiecta.*"⁹⁸ However, this misses the subtlety of Tertullian, Chrysostom, Augustine, and several other patristic writers. Patristic writers, as well as modern lexicographical research, encourage the conclusion of Collins: "Paul's rhetorical argument is constructed on the basis of a pun. He plays on the multiple meanings of 'head':"⁹⁹

4. Summary and Conclusions

(a) Head

The value of this translation and interpretation is that it addresses the issues raised by Fitzmyer and the lexicographical survey of TLG undertaken by Grudem. If our network of reader expectations in the modern West matched those of first-century Corinth and hellenistic Judaism, this would offer the most open-ended translation to carry the several nuances associated with the metaphorical extension and application of the term, and especially a wordplay with subsequent uses of the physiological *head* seems to be entailed in the following verses. Nevertheless, today's chain of literal and metaphorical associations is so exclusively bound up with institutional authority (witness the use of the term "headship" in late twentieth-century debates) that this translation and interpretation suggest a narrower focus than Paul probably has in mind. It is possible that it is drawn from its use in Corinthian discussion, but we cannot be sufficiently certain to place part of the verse in quotation marks (see below on Schrage's critique of Padgett). If we use the term "head," its multiple meanings from context to context as serving a polymorphous concept must always be kept in view.

(b) Source

This has eminent advocates, including three leading commentators, namely, Barrett, Fee, and Schrage. Yet in spite of claims to the contrary, the paucity of lexicographical evidence remains a major obstacle to this translation. Such contexts of *head of the river* are so self-evident as a transferred metaphor that they should be held aside from those contexts where no such clear signal is generated by the immediate context. Arguments from the relation between Christ and God as a parallel "control" in actuality would support all three (or four) translations or interpretations. Oddly, although we ourselves are hesitant to adopt *source*, advocates of this view might have strengthened their case by pointing out more strongly that ἐκ τοῦ ἀνδρός (of source) and διὰ τῆς γυναικός (of "mediate" creation) in 11:12 offers precisely the terminology of 8:6 about God and Christ. This weighs more seriously than broader discussions, and we have to judge whether it is sufficient to make it plausible that Paul expected this meaning to be understood by his readers in v. 3, ahead of his argument in v. 12.

97. Augustine, *On the Trinity*, 1:6:12. Elsewhere Augustine concedes that 11:3 combines the notions of mediator with Christ's being "of the very being of God" (*On the Trinity*, 6:10).

98. Origen, *De Principiis*, 2:6:1.

99. Jerome, *Comm. in Ep. 1 ad Cor.*, in Migne, *PL*, 30:749.

(c) Preeminent, Foremost, and Synecdoche for a Representative Role

This proposal has the merit of most clearly drawing interactively on the metaphorical conjunction between physiological head (which is far and away the most frequent, "normal" meaning) and the notion of prominence, i.e., the most conspicuous or top-most manifestation of that for which the term also functions as synecdoche for the whole. The public face is linked with responsibility and representation in the public domain, since *head* is both the part of a person which is most conspicuous and that by which they are most readily distinguished or recognized. These aspects feature more frequently and prominently in first-century Greek texts than either the notions of ruler or source, although we agree with Fitzmyer and Grudem that a survey of Hatch-Redpath does not corroborate claims that when שׂרָא (ro'sh) means rule, LXX almost always uses a different Greek word.

More striking than links between *source* and the use of Genesis 2 in the immediate context is the total perspective of 1 Cor 8:1–14:40 that Paul corroborates the theoretical right of the "strong" or "prominent" to exercise their "knowledge" and "freedom," but dramatically places boundaries and qualifications around freedom and knowledge by insisting on the priority of love (as in 13:1–13), most especially love which will respect the self-awareness (conscience??) and self-esteem of the "weak," who must not be permitted to stumble. If Paul asserts a theoretical hierarchy, which does indeed correspond with "knowledge" of the creation order, the foremost within this order must protect the status and self-respect of "the weak" for whom they must take responsibility (synecdoche). The more anyone stresses "prominence," the more that person must ensure that "the other" does not experience the self-humiliation expressed in 12:15, "If the foot (sic, ποῦς), should say, 'because I am not a hand, I do not belong to the body,' just because of this does it not belong to the body?" Hence women use prophetic speech alongside men. However, at Corinth women as well as men tended to place "knowledge" and "freedom" before love in the Christian sense. Paul does not permit their "freedom" as part of the gospel new creation to destroy their proper self-respect and respect in the eyes of others by taking part in worship dressed like an "available" woman. That is not love, for it brings "shame" on themselves, their menfolk, and on God.

One writer goes a considerable part of the way toward making this point, but exempts gender for the wrong reason. Dale Martin rightly agrees that the appropriate head covering provides a sign of "nonavailability" for respectable women who appear in public, most especially when thoughts are to be focused on God in corporate worship. This "was understood in ancient culture to protect vulnerable women from the penetrating gaze and from dangerous invasion."¹⁰⁰ Throughout this epistle, Martin rightly urges, there is a sense in which Paul "attempts to make the weak strong and the strong weak."¹⁰¹ Although Martin does not invoke the principle here, this is part of the "reversal" which stems from the role of the cross as "ground and criterion" (Schrage) of Christian life and thought. However, Martin argues that "when it comes to the male-female hierarchy, Paul abruptly renounces any status-questioning stance. . . . This . . . has to do with physiology. The 'stuff' of female nature is differently constituted from that of male nature."¹⁰²

100. Collins, *First Cor*, 396; cf. 405–6.

101. Martin, *The Corinthian Body*, 242; cf. 233–41.

102. *Ibid.*, 248.

This is less than convincing, however, in the light of J. Gundry-Volf's more careful arguments about the dialectic between creation, culture, or society and eschatology. *Paul insists on gender distinctiveness*. That goes for the *men* (vv. 4, 7 with Murphy-O'Connor) no less than for the *women* (vv. 5, 6, 7b). However, if love takes priority over freedom, any competitiveness about "authority" becomes obsolete in the new order, even if a reciprocity of relationship allows different inputs to the relation of mutuality; rather, the entailments of protection of, and respect for, "the other" hold greater prominence than issues of "authority" within the wholeness of Paul's dialectic. Here *lexicography, theories of metaphor, exegesis, and the continuity of 8:1-14:14 cohere well together*. Neither "headship," nor "order," nor "equality" alone conveys the complexity and wholeness of Paul's theology. Again, *multiple meaning holds the key*.

Some residual issues in v. 3 deserve brief attention. NRSV translates *ὁ ἀνὴρ* in the middle clause as *husband* (against *man* in REB, NIV, NJB), although it has *man* in the first and third propositions. A few commentators defend *husband*, but the overwhelming majority of writers convincingly argue that the issue concerns gender relations as a whole, not simply those within the more restricted family circle.¹⁰³ *Θέλω δὲ* should be rendered as an adversative (with NRSV, NJB, REB, Fee, and others; as against NIV, *now . . .*). This also renders still more problematic A. Padgett's argument that the *θέλω δὲ ὑμᾶς εἰδέναι* wording suggests that Paul is introducing a Corinthian formula in v. 3, a thesis which Fee and Schrage both reject.¹⁰⁴ Perhaps, as Murphy-O'Connor argues, Paul commends the readers for maintaining the tradition that women can be active in prophetic speech, but (*δὲ*) attacks men and women equally for generating signals which blur gender distinctiveness in unacceptable ways by each appearing with inappropriate headgear.¹⁰⁵

4 The Greek phrase *κατὰ κεφαλῆς ἔχων* is translated by *with his head covered* in NJB and NIV (also *who keeps his head covered*, REB; or *with something on his head*, NRSV; but NIV mg. note, or . . . *with long hair . . .*, signals a well-known difficulty). This is all the more important since, as Murphy-O'Connor insists, Paul's first warning against departure from church tradition concerns the clothing or head style of *men*, not women.¹⁰⁶ As we noted at the end of our introduction to 11:2-16, Richard Oster vehemently attacks the suggestions of Weiss, Bruce, and Fee (and Meyer and others could be added) that the notion of men wearing head coverings in the course of preparing or uttering prophetic speech is "hypothetical," together with Fee's conclusion that reconstructions of the situation cannot be more than "specula-

103. *Ibid.*, 248-49.

104. Orr and Walther, *1 Cor* 259, argue that *husband* is perhaps more likely; cf. also C. S. Keener, *Paul, Women, Wives* (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1992), 32-36.

105. Padgett, "Paul on Women in the Church: The Contradictions of Coiffure in 1 Cor 11:2-16," 78-79; (cf. 69-86); criticized by Fee, *First Epistle*, 501, n. 37, and by Schrage, *Der erste Brief*, 2:500, n. 63.

106. Murphy O'Connor, "Sex and Logic," 483.

107. *Ibid.* (above).

tive."¹⁰⁷ Oster argues that Paul's concern that the church should not retreat into the defensive stance of a sectarian ghetto (cf. 1 Cor 5:10) ensures that the perceptions of society in Roman Corinth mattered to him, and that the church itself would readily have carried with it many cultural norms from Roman society of the first century. Archaeological evidence from coins, statues, and architectural monuments provide an important source for seeking to understand what is at issue here.

THE TRANSLATION OF *κατὰ κεφαλῆς ἔχων*: COVERED HEAD OR LONG HAIR? (11:4)

Archaeological evidence from Rome itself to the Roman East is unambiguous, Oster urges, in depicting the "liturgical head covering" of men when they pray or use prophetic speech: "the practice of men covering their heads in the context of prayer and prophecy was a common pattern of Roman piety and widespread during the late Republic and early Empire. Since Corinth was a Roman colony, there should be little doubt that this aspect of Roman religious practice deserves greater attention by commentators than it was received."¹⁰⁸

Horsley (1998) is one of the most recent writers to argue that Romans and Jews prayed with *heads . . . covered*, in contrast to the Greek practice of praying bareheaded.¹⁰⁹ Yet Oster also insists that it is a third standard "error" to impose "later Jewish practices onto the Corinthian situation."¹¹⁰ Bruce, Barrett, Kümmel, and Oepke, among others, all appeal to Jewish traditions.¹¹¹ We also know from archaeological evidence that there was a Jewish synagogue at Corinth.¹¹² Nevertheless, Oster argues that neither the OT, nor the LXX, nor Qumran, nor the Gospels, nor Philo, nor Josephus, nor even the *Mishnah* offers any evidence for this. Hypotheses that men wore the traditional Jewish *tallith* or *yarmulke* "distort the historical use of the prayer shawl by Jewish men."¹¹³ The context of wrapping oneself in a cloak "while absolving his vows . . . is not the specific activity that Paul addresses," even if the *Tosefta* mentions such a practice.¹¹⁴

108. Oster, "Use, Misuse and Neglect of Archaeological Evidence in Some Modern Works on 1 Corinthians (1 Cor 7:1-5; 8:10; 11:2-16; 12:14-26)," 68; cf. 52-73, esp. 67-69. Cf. also Weiss, *Der erste Korintherbrief*, 271; Bruce, *1 and 2 Cor*, 104; Fee, *First Epistle*, 506-8; Meier, "On the Veiling of Hermeneutics," 218.

109. *Ibid.*, 69. For evidence cf., e.g., B. S. Ridgway, "Sculpture from Corinth," *Hesperia* 50 (1981): 432-33; and F. P. Johnson, *Corinth, IX: Sculpture 1896-1923* (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1931), 70-72; E. Alföldi-Rosenbaum, *Roman and Early Byzantine Portrait Sculpture in Asia Minor* (London: Oxford University Press, 1966). See further Oster, "When Men Wore Veils to Worship: The Historical Context of 1 Cor 11:4," 481-505, and the statue of Augustus in the Julian Basilica in James Wiseman, *Corinth and Rome* (1979), 1, Plate 8.

110. Horsley, *1 Cor*, 154.

111. Oster, "When Men Wore Veils to Worship," *NTS* 34 (1988): 487.

112. Barrett, *First Epistle*, 249-50; Bruce, *1 and 2 Cor*, 104; A. Oepke, "καλόπτω," *TDNT*, 3:563.

113. For archaeological evidence of the inscription concerning the synagogue, see the reproduction in Wiseman, *Corinth and Rome*, Plate 5, no. 8.

114. Oster, "When Men Wore Veils to Worship," 487.